2 edition of Leniency programs and cartel prosecution found in the catalog.
Leniency programs and cartel prosecution
|Statement||Massimo Motta and Michele Polo.|
|Series||EUI working paper -- no.99/34|
|Contributions||Polo, Michele., European University Institute (Economics Department)|
Leniency to Combat Hard Core Cartels: Policy Guidance to Strengthen the Indonesian Competition Framework (English) Abstract. Indonesia has the possibility of incorporating effective tools to combat cartels in its competition law. are involved. The framework principles for the leniency policy are set out in the publications ‘Applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases’ and ‘Guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty’. The CMA has also published prosecution guidance in respect of .
Cartel Destabilization and Leniency Programs - Empirical Evidence Gordon J. KLEIN ZEW Mannheim Germany Decem Abstract Leniency programs as a tool for cartel detection and cartel destabilization, have been im-plemented since the early nineties. Theoretical work has shown that leniency programs can. Cartel Ringleaders and the Corporate Leniency Program Iwan Bos, Department of Organization & Strategy, Maastricht Corporate leniency programs around the world offer cartel members the opportunity to report cartel prosecution. By contrast, if the probability of conviction is relatively high, then it is Cited by:
Almost 10 years after the introduction of the leniency programme in Serbia, the Commission for Protection of Competition (’Commission’) adopted on 27 of September the first decision granting immunity from a fine to a cartel participant. The cornerstone of cartel enforcement in the United States and elsewhere is a com-mitment to the lenient prosecution of early confessors. A burgeoning game-theoretical literature is ambiguous regarding the impacts of leniency. I develop a theoretical model of cartel behavior that provides empirical predictions and moment conditions, and ap-.
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We study the enforcement of competition policy against collusion under Leniency Programs, which give reduced fines to firms revealing information to the Antitrust Authority.
Such programs give firms an incentive to break collusion, but may also have a pro-collusive effect, since they decrease the expected cost of by: COVID Resources. Reliable information about the coronavirus (COVID) is available from the World Health Organization (current situation, international travel).Numerous and frequently-updated resource results are available from this ’s WebJunction has pulled together information and resources to assist library staff as they consider how to handle.
Leniency programs and cartel prosecution Article in International Journal of Industrial Organization 21(3) March with 29 Reads How we measure 'reads'. Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution MOTTA, Massimo ; POLO, Michele International Journal of Industrial Organization,21, 3, Cited by: Leniency programs and cartel prosecution.
Author links open overlay panel Massimo Motta a Michele Polo b. Show more. But the leniency program might also give rise to a perverse effect. Since it allows colluding firms to pay reduced fines, it may have ex-ante a pro-collusive effect, given that it decreases the expected cost of Cited by: Antitrust authorities have set up leniency programs for cartel members that denounce their collusive agreements.
These programs help prosecute participants and. Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution Volume of CEPR publication Volume of Centre for Economic Policy Research London: Discussion paper series Issue of Discussion paper, ISSN Volume of Discussion paper: Centre for Economic Policy Research EUI Working papers in economics, ISSN EUI working paper.
ECO. "Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," Economics Working Papers eco99/23, European University Institute. Andreoni, James, " The desirability of a permanent tax amnesty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol.
45(2), pagesJuly. "Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," Working PapersIGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. Motta, Massimo & Polo, Michele, " Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," CEPR Discussion PapersC.E.P.R.
Discussion Papers. A Matter of Trust: Enduring Leniency Lessons for the Future of Cartel Enforcement. Febru "The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Over the Last Two Decades" May 1, Scott Hammond on Stolt-Nielsen. Octo Cracking Cartels with Leniency Programs. Novem Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency Program.
Abstract. The paper explores the interdependencies between corporate and individual leniency programs. In a duopoly model where corporations are separated into representing owners and operating managers, conflicts between the two types of agents arise if the relative benefits of participating in the corresponding leniency programs by: 7.
The leniency policy also has a very deterrent effect on cartel formation and it destabilizes the operation of existing cartels as it seeds distrust and suspicion among cartel members. In order to benefit from the Notice, companies can approach the Commission directly or through a.
Library Open Science Team European University Institute Badia Fiesolana - Via dei Roccettini 9 I San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) Italy E-mail: [email protected] - Phone: [+39] Cited by: Leniency programs are an important investigative tool which give cartel’s members incentives to report their cartel activity and cooperate with competition authorities.
We present their main objectives, their development in different countries, their direct and indirect effects and how these programs could be improved. CORNERSTONES OF AN EFFECTIVE LENIENCY PROGRAM. and provide evidence against the other cartel members.
Leniency programs have led to the detection and dismantling of the largest global cartels ever prosecuted and resulted in record-breaking fines in the United States, Canada, the EU and other jurisdictions.
the fact is that the U.S. tion. The set-up of our analysis is close to Motta and Polo () who analyze leniency programs that allow rms to receive ne reductions for self-reporting a cartel when an investigation opens.
They show that self-reporting might arise in equilibrium and reduce the antitrust authority’s cost of cartel prosecution. At the same time, leniency Cited by: Leniency programs and cartel prosecution.
Massimo Motta and Michele Polo (). International Journal of Industrial Organization,vol. 21, issue 3, Date: References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc Citations: View citations in EconPapers () Track citations by RSS feed Downloads: (external link)Cited by: Such a discussion would be especially timely as the globalization of cartel enforcement – now frequently in connection with a leniency program – continues.
The first caveat is the “rush to leniency.” Leniency programs create a powerful incentive to report price fixing. With the help of guest editor Rein Wesseling, we’re taking a look at the current state of cartel enforcement, in particular leniency programs.
Is their early success threatened by new roadblocks, including conflicts with enforcing individual criminal charges, different global approaches, hybrid cartel cases, more sophisticated risk analyses.
investigation of the vitamins cartel, the amnesty applicant’s co-operation led Note by the Editor The OECD Competition Committee adopted in the report on leniency programs to fight hard core cartels. This report contains descriptions and multiple references to leniency programs in Member countries and European Commission.
At the same time, leniency programs might have a pro-collusive effect by reducing the expected cost of antitrust prosecution. This might increase ex ante cartel formation. Aubert et al. () consider an environment where the probability of conviction is constant over time and propose introducing rewards for informants on top of amnesty from Cited by: CPI Europe Column edited by Anna Tzanaki (Competition Policy International) & Juan Delgado (Global Economics Group) presents.
Leniency Programs – The Devil Is In The Details by Marcin Trepka & Martyna Wurm (K & L Gates) 1 Intro by Anna Tzanaki (Competition Policy International). The spotlight of the CPI Europe Column this month turns to leniency.The Fight against Hard Core Cartels in Europe.
Trends, Challenges and Best international Practices there is still need to improve the effectiveness of cartel prosecution in Europe. This book assesses the current system, identifies recent trends, best practices and future challenges.
the design and implementation of leniency programs Brand: Competition Law/Droit de la Concurrence.